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Notes
OPENING THE FLOODGATES OR FILLING THE GAP?:
PERDOMO V. HOLDER ADVANCES THE NINTH CIRCUIT ONE STEP
CLOSER TO RECOGNIZING GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS
JESSE IMBRIANO*
I. INTRODUCTION
After growing up in a society where she is the property of the men in
her life and having suffered decades of extreme cruelty and debilitating
abuse, a woman finally gathers the strength to flee.' Upon arriving in the
United States, she is told that she is not entitled to protection and is re-
turned to her aggressor and a country that will not protect her.2 Asylum is
contemporary society's promise that those seeking safe haven will find it;
however, complex implementation has meant that many individuals with
legitimate, court-recognized fear of persecution are left without recourse
and forcibly returned to the domain of their persecutors.3 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's recent precedential opinion in Perdomo v. Holded' implicitly signified
the final step in a trend towards permitting greater access to asylum relief
for victims of gender-based persecution.5
* This article was inspired by and is dedicated to M. and R., two of my earliest
clients, who are too familiar with the refusal by Immigration Courts to recognize
gender-based particular social groups for asylum claims.
1. See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 927-28 (B.I.A. 1999) (denying asy-
lum relief to victim of extreme and frequent physical and sexual abuse). For a
discussion of the victim's complex and lengthy asylum battle, see infra notes 46-65
and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (recounting
order by immigration judge denying asylum and ordering deportation). For a dis-
cussion of the applicant's asylum case in Kasinga, see infra notes 40-45 and accom-
panying text.
3. See, e.g., Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 861 (9th Cir. 2009) (af-
firming Board of Immigration Appeals's (BIA) denial of asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under Convention Against Torture because applicant did not
meet statutory requirements).
4. 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010). This Note addresses the Ninth Circuit's re-
cent holding after an immigration judge found the petitioner, a Guatemalan na-
tional and asylum applicant, to be "credible and truthful" in her fear of
persecution if forcibly returned to Guatemala-a finding that was not contradicted
on appeal-but nonetheless ineligible for asylum and thus deportable. See id. at
664-65 (remanding case to BIA for further consideration as to whether "Guatema-
lan women" can constitute particular social group).
5. See id. at 666 (discussing absence of precedential decision on whether gen-
der can constitute particular social group but acknowledging that "[o]ur case law
examining asylum claims based on membership in a particular social group contin-
ues to evolve"); see also Deborah Anker, Membership in a Particular Social Group: De-
(327)
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A successful asylum application requires more than a showing that the
applicant suffered persecution or that there exists a likelihood of future
persecution if the applicant is forcibly returned to their home country.6
Amongst other requirements, the applicant must show that the persecu-
tion is on account of one of five enumerated grounds: race, religion, na-
tionality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.7
velopments in U.S. Law, in 1556 PLI/CoRP 195, 202 (2006) (arguing that recent
decisions by courts of appeals, especially in Ninth Circuit, demonstrate trend to-
wards greater willingness to recognize gender as basis of particular social group);
Fed. Court Opens Door for Guatemalan Asylum Claim, DAILY J. (San Mateo), July 13,
2010 (noting that Perdomo continues expansion of eligibility for asylum beyond
traditional beneficiaries); Ruling on Women May Spur Asylum Claims, N.Y. TIMES, JUly
16, 2010, at A10 (suggesting that Perdomo may allow many others in similar circum-
stances to argue for grant of asylum).
6. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (42) (A) (Supp. 2010) (establishing requirements for asylum). The INA
establishes that an individual either physically present in the United States or upon
arrival at a United States border may seek recognition as an asylee regardless of the
individual's current status as long as certain exceptions do not apply. See INA
§ 208(a) (1) (discussing process for asylum application). The Act does not
uniquely define "asylum" but instead requires that the applicant apply for asylum
and meet the requirements for status as a refugee as defined by INA
§ 101(a) (42) (A). See INA § 208(b) (1) (defining refugee). The Act, in referring to
asylees, does not repeat the five enumerated categories for protection, but it does
explicitly list as the first bar to being granted asylum a history of participating in
persecution of another on account of membership in one of the five enumerated
groups. See INA § 208(b) (2) (A) (i) (barring certain persecutors from seeking
asylum).
Gender is not explicitly mentioned as one of the protected grounds for asy-
lum, so claims for asylum by women are to be adjudicated through the same lens as
claims brought by men, but some have argued that the entire asylum adjudication
process is biased towards a popular understanding of the paradigmatic male asylee.
See Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women
Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1199, 1216-17 (2009) (pro-
posing that certain crimes uniquely affect women and are result of societal status
of women). Thus, persecution directed at women as women and forms of violence
more common to women, such as rape, have been seen as forms of private perse-
cution and have been assumed to be outside the bounds of ordinary asylum law.
See id. (suggesting institutionalized distinction between "public" persecution that
affects male asylees and "private" persecution that affects female asylees).
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (defining refugee and including require-
ment of persecution "on account of' enumerated grounds). The first three
grounds of persecution that qualify for asylum relief-race, nationality, and relig-
ion-are relatively straight-forward, although novel claims can be made. See, e.g.,
Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009) (referencing history of eth-
nic-based tensions leading to coups in Fiji and previous acknowledgement by court
of racial tensions in Fiji for claim brought by Indo-Fijian applicant); Kumar v. Gon-
zales, 204 F. App'x 714, 715 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that record showed that Indo-
Fijian applicant's assailants had made racially offensive statements during attack).
The fourth ground, political opinion, allows greater opportunity for unique
definition and wide interpretation. See Donald W. Yoo, Exploring the Doctrine of Im-
puted Political Opinion and Its Application in the Ninth Circuit, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
391, 395 (2005) (noting that "political opinion" is not statutorily defined by INA
yet INA directs adjudicators to interpret term broadly). The lack of a definition
combined with the statutory directive to interpret broadly has lead to asylum pro-
328
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The meaning of the fifth enumerated ground for protection, membership
in a particular social group, has been the subject of varying opinions by
the courts and has caused considerable debate.8
The term "particular social group" was coined by the United Nations
Protocol on the Status of Refugees in 1951 and adopted into United States
law both by the ratification of the protocol in 1968 and the passage of the
Refugee Act in 1980.9 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) recog-
nized asylees by reference to the international definition of refugees but
tection for unconventional victims of political-based persecution and has also left
unsettled the question of who qualifies for relief on the grounds of political opin-
ion. See id. (noting contrary trends). Like the other enumerated grounds for asy-
lum relief, it is necessary to prove not only that the applicant fits within the
enumerated group (in this case, that the applicant holds the political belief), but
also that the applicant has been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion and that this persecution is "on account of" that political belief. See id. (em-
phasizing requirements for asylum beyond holding unpopular beliefs).
Several circuits, most frequently the Ninth Circuit, have also adopted a doc-
trine of imputed political opinion, recognizing eligibility for an applicant when the
applicant has been persecuted on account of political opinion that the applicant
does not in fact hold but is believed to hold, although this premise was qualified
after a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court. See id. at 397, 403 (distinguish-
ing holding of political opinion from assumption by others that individual holds
opinion). Subsequently, General Counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) opined not only that the doctrine of imputed political opinion is
valid but that imputed membership in one of the other four protected groups,
including imputed membership in a particular social group, may create eligibility
for asylum if the other requirements are met. See Memorandum from U.S. Office
of the Gen. Counsel to Jan Ting, Acting Dir. of Office of Int'l Affairs, and Bayer,
Dir. of Asylum Branch, Legal Opinion on Continued Viability of the Doctrine of Imputed
Political Opinion (Jan. 19, 1993), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/428b4b182.html (recognizing validity of imputed political opinion, specifi-
cally, and potential validity of imputed characteristics of other four enumerated
grounds).
8. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social Visibility" in Defining a
"Particular Social Group" and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual
Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL'v REV. 47, 48 (2008) (discussing current
debate in American courts between two possible bases for defining "particular so-
cial group" and varying approaches throughout major common law countries); see
also infra notes 82-122 (discussing three tests developed by courts for evaluating
proposed social groups). But see Anker, supra note 5, at 197-98 (suggesting that
while "membership in particular social group" appears to be least clear of enumer-
ated grounds for asylum, it is actually most transparent because other four grounds
are merely specifically defined types of particular social groups).
9. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1575-76 (9th Cir. 1986) (ac-
knowledging influence of international protocol on adoption of United States law
and thus recognizing HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS promulgated by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) as authoritative source for interpretation of term (citing U.N. HIGH
COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter UNHCR HANDBOOK])). Before being codified in United States law, the five
enumerated categories were defined by the international community in direct re-
sponse to the events in Europe prior to 1951. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees,
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 14-15 (2007), available at
329
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did not define what constituted a particular social group.10 Although the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) seemed to establish unequivocally
that gender is one of the paradigmatic social groups, the BIA and circuit
courts have been consistently reluctant to accept gender as the basis of a
social group without some other qualifying characteristic. 1 Claims com-
bining gender and nationality, such as a claim asserted by all women from
a specific country, have also met opposition.12
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aal0.html (defining refugee). Participants at the
United Nations Convention defined "refugee" as a person who
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, national-
ity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.
Id. at 14.
10. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576 (finding that because promulgated
international guidelines do not provide substantial specificity for delimiting partic-
ular social groups, court must look closely at statutory language, particularly terms
"particular" and "social" as modifying "group," allowing category to be applied
broadly and flexibly but not without limit). The court suggested a four-step pro-
cess for asylum claims based on membership in a particular social group: deter-
mining whether a cognizable social group exists; determining that the applicant is
a member of the group; determining that the group has been persecuted for the
characteristics of its members; and, determining if there are special circumstances
permitting mere membership in the group to be sufficient for a claim of asylum.
See id. at 1574-75 (suggesting this process to address unique claim of young men as
particular social group). The threshold question, however, is whether the claimed
group justifies "refugee status under the applicable immigration laws." See id. at
1575 (emphasizing primary importance of cognizable particular social group); see
also Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledg-
ing lack of definition for particular social group in INA and therefore seeking to
use United Nations Protocol), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409
F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009). In 2010, Senator Leahy introduced legislation entitled
the Refugee Protection Act, which, among other changes to the INA, would define
as a particular social group "any groups whose members share a characteristic that
is either immutable or fundamental to identity, conscience, or the exercise of the
person's human rights such that the person should not be required to change it."
See Refugee Protection Act, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (42) (D) (2010) (defining
particular social group).
11. See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1234-35 (discussing apparent contradictions
in precedential asylum law by juxtaposing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211
(B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439
(B.I.A. 1987), a frequently cited case that explicitly recognized gender as particular
social group, with Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660 (2d. Cir. 1991), which held that
groups defined solely by age or gender are too broad, and Safaie v. I.N.S., 25 F.3d
636 (8th Cir. 1994), which held that gender-based particular social group was in-
sufficient because it would mean all women in nation are potentially subject to
persecution).
12. See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1234-35 (discussing attempts to qualify
claims of gender-based persecution by expanding definition of group to include
nationality or other secondary factors).
[Vol. 56: p. 327330
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Immigration law is a form of administrative law, and certain enumer-
ated decisions by immigration judges, including asylum decisions, can be
appealed to the BIA.1 3 An asylum applicant may seek review of a BIA deci-
sion by the federal circuit court with jurisdiction over the geographical
area where the case was originally brought, but a published decision by the
circuit court overruling the BIA will only have precedential effect within
the respective circuit court's jurisdiction.1 4 Because review by both the
13. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (a) (2011) (creating BIA within Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) and delineating its makeup); id. § 1003.1(b) (specify-
ing situations in which BIA has appellate jurisdiction). The United States Immi-
gration Courts are organized under the EOIR under the direction of the Attorney
General. See 6 U.S.C. § 521 (a) (2006) (establishing EOIR within Department of
Justice under direct supervision of Attorney General); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (same).
Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, the
INS was an agency within the Department ofJustice responsible for the execution
of immigration law and immigration adjudicators were part of the INS. See ANNA
MARIE GALLAGHER, IMMIGRATION LAw SERVICE § 1-176 (2d ed. Supp. 2010) (discuss-
ing administrative organization of immigration law). The EOIR was created in
1983 and a reorganization of the Department of Justice separated immigration
judges from the INS. See id. (noting department reorganization). The Homeland
Security Act of 2003 replaced the INS with three new administrative agencies
within the Department of Homeland Security for the enforcement of immigration
law but kept the EOIR within the Department of Justice and, therefore, further
differentiated between enforcement agents of the Department of Homeland Se-
curity and neutral adjudicators of the Department of Justice for the purposes of
immigration. See id. (describing effects of creation of Department of Homeland
Security on immigration); see also 6 U.S.C. § 291 (abolishing INS); 6 U.S.C.§ 521 (a) (acknowledging role of EOIR).
Like all appellate courts, the BIA is limited in the scope of its review authority:
questions of fact can be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard and ques-
tions of law or discretion may be reviewed de novo. See 67 Fed. Reg. 54878, 54880
(Aug. 26, 2002) (explaining reforms in management of BIA cases generally).
Under Attorney General John Ashcroft, the BIA's membership and processes were
reorganized to address a considerable backlog in cases and to streamline the
processing of new cases, but the new policies, in some instances, permitted single
BIA members to affirm opinions by an immigration judge (instead of review by
three-member panels) and permitted the BIA to dispose of an increased number
of cases without opinion. See DAVID NGARURI KENNEY & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ASYLUM
DENIED: A REFUGEE'S STRUGGLE FOR SAFETY IN AMERICA 169-71 (2008) (criticizing
Ashcroft reforms for lessening quality and impact of BIA review).
14. See GALLAGHER, supra note 13, § 1-183 (describing limits of BIA jurisdic-
tion and effect of circuit court holding); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (establishing and
limiting role of circuit court in reviewing appeals). When considering BIA deci-
sions, circuit courts have jurisdiction to review questions of law de novo but ques-
tions of fact only for substantial error. See Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972, 977
(9th Cir. 2007) (considering court's authority for reviewing BIA decision).
Because immigration law is administrative law, if the circuit court disagrees
with the BIA, the court will generally remand the case to the BIA for reconsidera-
tion consistent with the court's opinion. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185
(2006) (reversing Ninth Circuit for failing to remand case to BIA for further re-
view); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 730 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing BIA's
expertise in adjudicating asylum claims and thus remanding after noting such pol-
icy set forth in DamaizeJob v. I.N.S., 787 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)). In the
Perdomo case, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BIA's evaluation of gender as a
particular social group but, recognizing the precedent in Gonzales v. Thomas, re-
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BIA and the appropriate circuit court is available, the Supreme Court in-
frequently grants certiorari for immigration cases.' 5 Thus, an immigra-
tion issue is often settled through a trend amongst the circuit courts rather
than by a single decision of the Supreme Court.16 The Ninth Circuit's
decision in Sanchez-Trujillo v. LN. S.17 has been cited widely for its interpre-
tation of membership in a particular social group, but that court's holding
in Perdomo may set a new standard throughout the United States.' 8
In light of the Ninth Circuit's apparent break from its own precedent
established in Sanchez-Trujillo, this Note considers the implication of
Perdomo through the expanded role of gender in defining a particular so-
cial group for asylum eligibility.' 9 Part II considers the origins of the par-
ticular social group requirement in United States asylum law and the
progression of how this term has been interpreted through seminal court
decisions. 20 Part III analyzes three distinct possible frameworks for ac-
cepting a particular social group: the immutable characteristic test, the
voluntary association test, and the social visibility test.2 ' Part IV suggests
that an unprincipled fear of "opening the floodgates" has confused the
manded the case for additional consideration. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d
662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing agency's entitlement to first instance review
under ordinary remand rule).
15. See KENNEY & SCHRAC, supra note 13, at 255 (discussing unlikelihood that
asylum applicant's case would be granted certiorari).
16. See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Perse-
cution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 561-
62 (1993) (suggesting that, because final decisions on United Statues immigration
issues are generally issued by various circuit courts, there has been greater varia-
tion in immigration jurisprudence and understanding of what constitutes member-
ship in particular social group).
17. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
18. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 669 (referencing BIA's reliance on Ninth Circuit
ruling in Sanchez-Trujillo as seminal case); see, e.g., Yusif v. Holder, 361 F. App'x 667,
671 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Sanchez-Trujillo); Deokaran v. Holder, 317 F. App'x 87,
89 (2d Cir. 2009) (same); Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 344 (3d Cir.
2008) (same); Abuali v. Att'y Gen., 281 F. App'x 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2008) (same);
Blanco-Salvador v. Gonzales, 207 F. App'x 61, 63 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); Serat-
Ajanel v. Gonzales, 207 F. App'x 468, 470 (5th Cir. 2006) (same); Perez-Molina v.
Gonzales, 193 F. App'x 313, 315 (5th Cir. 2006) (same); Gamez v. Gonzales, 126 F.
App'x 318, 322 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 877,
881 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); Laurente-Pareja v. I.N.S., 139 F.3d 890, 890 (4th Cir.
1998) (same); Iliev v. I.N.S., 127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1997) (same);
Gebremichael v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); see also Anker, supra
note 5, at 202 (implying Ninth Circuit's role in setting trends among circuit
courts).
19. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666-67 (referencing Sanchez-Trujillo without nega-
tive comment but holding that interpretation of "membership in a particular social
group" is evolving term).
20. For a discussion of the history of gender as the basis of membership in a
particular social group, see infra notes 24-80 and accompanying text and Fullerton,
supra note 16, at 523-31 (chronicling crucial decisions in history of United States
immigration jurisprudence).
21. For a discussion of the conflict between the immutable characteristic test
and the social visibility and voluntary association tests, see infra notes 81-121 and
[Vol. 56: p. 327332
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issues involved while a more honest application of the law permits-even
demands-the recognition of gender to fill a gap in the current applica-
tion of the existing legal framework.2 2 Finally, Part V considers Perdomo's
approach to gender and membership in a particular social group, while
Part VI considers the likely impact of this precedent.23
II. GENDER AS A PARTICULAR SoCIAL GROUP: RECOGNIZED, REJECTED, AND
GRADUALLY READOPTED
Gender was noticeably absent from the list of protected classes in the
refugee definition promulgated in 1951.24 Because gender was not an
enumerated basis for protection, women were expected to seek refugee
status within the same categories available to men.25 The absence of gen-
der as a specifically mentioned basis does not necessarily mean that gen-
der cannot constitute a particular social group.26 The dominant view in
the international community, as specified by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is that a particular social group
may be defined by a shared innate characteristic alone.2 7 Gender, argua-
bly, is the quintessential example of such an innate characteristic.2 8
accompanying text and Marouf, supra note 8, at 51-60 (discussing two approaches
in relation to international law).
22. For analysis of the popular "floodgates" argument and its limitations, see
infra notes 122-48 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of Perdomo v. Holder and a suggestion of its potential im-
pact, see infra notes 149-212 and accompanying text.
24. See Andrea Binder, Gender and the "Membership in a Particular Social Group"
Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 169-71
(2001) (suggesting that refugee definition was drafted to protect political (mascu-
line) victims rather than social or economic (feminine) victims).
25. See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1217 (noting that women were expected to
fit within general refugee definition but that definition was inherently biased to-
wards conception of male refugee). Distinguishing between persecution of wo-
men who happen to be women and persecution of women on account of their
status as women, the United Nations Convention more clearly protects those wo-
men who happen to be persecuted for the same reasons as male refugees than
those women who are persecuted because they are women. See Binder, supra note
24, at 167-68 (arguing that refugee definition adopted public/private sphere divi-
sion that failed to protect crimes against women that arise solely on account of
womanhood, such as rape and female genital mutilation).
26. See Fullerton, supra note 16, at 509-10 (noting that membership in particu-
lar social group was added to definition of refugee to allow yet unforeseen groups
who might be subject to persecution to seek protection); see also Binder, supra note
24, at 171 (citing Canadian case in emphasizing that failure to specify gender does
not preclude applicability of definition to gender (citing Canada (Att'y Gen.) v.
Ward, [1993] 103 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 33 (Can.))).
27. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 48, 90 (referencing judicial interpretation by
most other common law countries, based upon Acosta decision in United States,
that particular social group is defined by innate characteristic).
28. See Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (suggesting, by
invoking ejusdem generis, that inherent characteristic is appropriate test and would
thus include "sex, color, or kinship ties"), overruled on other grounds by Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
$33
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In Matter ofAcosta,29 the BIA seemed to establish a substantive role for
gender.30 Rejecting the asylum seeker's claim that taxi drivers and "per-
sons engaged in the transportation industry in El Salvador" comprise a
particular social group, the BIA "interpret[ed] the phrase . . . to mean
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a
group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic ...
such as sex, color, or kinship ties."3 1 This seemingly clear statement ap-
peared to definitively answer the question of whether gender could consti-
tute a particular social group.32 Yet, despite frequent citations to Acosta,
neither the BIA nor the circuit courts have adopted the plain meaning of
this holding.3 3
29. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
30. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 48, 52-54, 90 (noting that many common law
countries have followed Acosta and that most United States jurisdictions claim to
follow Acosta in adjudicating gender-based claims); see also Perdomo v. Holder, 611
F.3d 662, 665-66 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Acosta as starting point of analysis of gen-
der-based claim for particular social group). In addition to stating the test to be
used for defining a particular social group, the Acosta board carefully considered
the legal sources for adjudicating asylum claims and qualified the use of interna-
tional sources. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211, 220 (holding that international
interpretations of agreement can be informative but are not binding on United
States courts). In Acosta, the BIA also carefully considered each of the elements of
both asylum and withholding of removal claims and established the tests for each
element. See id. at 219-37 (evaluating each element individually).
31. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232-33 (emphasis added) (affirming finding
by immigration judge). The asylum applicant, a taxi driver in El Salvador, joined a
cooperative of taxi drivers and became an administrator of the cooperative. See id.
at 216 (considering basis for asylum). The applicant and other members of the
cooperative were solicited to take part in anti-government demonstrations by un-
known sources but refused. See id. (considering basis for asylum). After continued
threats, members of the cooperative were attacked and some were killed. See id. at
217 (considering claim of persecution). After receiving personal threats, the appli-
cant fled to the United States, sought asylum, and testified that he would not re-
turn to El Salvador to work as a taxi driver and would not find work there. See id.
(considering willingness to return and continued threat of persecution). In addi-
tion to finding that applicant did not qualify for asylum based on failure to estab-
lish persecution on account of membership in a qualifying particular social group,
and despite finding that the applicant did establish fear of persecution, the BIA
found that the fear was not well-founded, the applicant was not unable to return to
El Salvador, and the applicant did not qualify for withholding of deportation. See
id. at 236 (considering all elements of asylum claim and withholding of deporta-
tion relief and finding no basis for either relief sought).
32. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 51-52 (claiming definitive implication of
Acosta).
33. See Binder, supra note 24, at 179-80 (suggesting that while Acosta holding
seemed to clearly recognize gender as particular social group, United States juris-
prudence has been inconsistent and contradictory in applying this standard and
some courts have made impossible application of gender as basis of particular so-
cial group).
334 [Vol. 56: p. 327
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An early case that broke from Acosta's evaluation of gender and be-
came foundational for such analysis is Sanchez-Trujillo.34 In this case, de-
cided the year following Acosta, the Ninth Circuit had to determine
whether "young, working class, urban males" could constitute a cognizable
particular social group.3 5 The court did not rely solely on Acosta's "immu-
table characteristic" test but instead looked for an associational relation-
ship leading to a shared characteristic amongst group members.3 6 Like
Acosta, the Sanchez-Trujillo court mentioned a family group as the paradig-
matic particular social group but failed to mention gender in the same
context.37 Citing the lack of clear instruction in the international proto-
col and the Congressional record in promulgating the governing statute,
the court sought to approximate the intention of the legislature.3 8 The
court held that the statute protected cohesive, homogenous groups and
that groups that comprise large segments of the society not only defy the
intent of the legislature but also leave the requirements of the statute
meaningless.3 9
In an apparent move away from Sanchez-Trujillo and towards recogniz-
ing gender-based claims, the BIA granted asylum to the applicant in In re
34. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Perdomo, 611 F.2d at 668 (noting test Ninth Circuit established in Sanchez-Trujillo
and adoption of test more broadly by BIA); Michael G. Daugherty, Note, The Ninth
Circuit, the BIA, and the INS: The Shifting State of the Particular Social Group Definition
in the Ninth Circuit and Its Impact on Pending and Future Cases, 41 BRANDEIs L.J. 631,
638-40 (2003) (suggesting that two cases, Acosta and Sanchez-Trujillo, are seminal in
Ninth Circuit jurisprudence but that they provide contrasting tests).
35. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576-77 (considering proposed particular
social group). The applicant further defined the proposed particular social group
as those males who had not served in the military and opposed military service. See
id. at 1574 (considering distinction from previous, similar claims).
36. See id. at 1576 (emphasizing close affiliation element of particular social
group, failing to cite Acosta, and conceding that groups may be unconventional).
37. See id. at 1576 (citing family as appropriate particular social group because
most families share common interests and concerns); Lindsay A. Franke, Note, Not
Meeting the Standard: U.S. Asylum Law and Gender-Related Claims, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L. &
COMP. L. 605, 610-11 (2000) (suggesting that Sanchez-Trujillo is in direct opposition
to Acosta and that application of new voluntary association test to family groups
proves its logical inconsistency).
38. See Sanchez-Truillo, 801 F.2d at 1576 (noting lack of clarity and "dearth of
judicial authority" and, therefore, focusing directly on statutory language). The
court held that a particular social group must not include every broadly defined
segment of society, must be a collection of people closely affiliated with one an-
other who share some common interest or impulse, and must have as a central
concern the existence of a voluntary associational relationship. See id. (interpret-
ing statutory language).
39. See id. at 1577 (suggesting that applicant's interpretation of particular so-
cial group would allow universal eligibility for asylum). The court also held that
the applicant failed to demonstrate that persecution suffered was on account of
the membership in the particular social group. See id. (discussing additional re-
quirements for successful asylum claim).
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Kasinga.40 The asylum applicant fled Togo to avoid being forcibly sub-
jected to female genital mutilation (FGM). 4 1 The BIA recognized not
only that FGM constituted persecution, but also that the applicant quali-
fied for asylum based on her membership in the particular social group of
"young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM,
as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice."4 2 The BIA relied
on the immutable characteristic test without any indication of the need for
cohesiveness or homogeneity within the group.43 The applicant met the
nexus requirement by establishing that FGM is used to control the sexual
characteristics of women. 4 4 Thus, a woman in that society could seek asy-
lum because she was persecuted as a woman.4 5
The BIA, however, re-established its reluctance to recognize gender-
based particular social groups in its decision in In re R-A-,4 6 which fueled
40. 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996); see Richard C. Reuben, New Ground
for Asylum: Threatened Female Genital Mutilation Is Persecution, 82 A.B.A. J. 36, 36
(1996) (quoting applicant's lawyer, who viewed holding as indicative of trend to-
wards recognizing persecution of women).
41. See Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 358-59 (discussing applicant's testimony).
The applicant was protected from FGM as a child by her father, but when the
applicant's father died, her aunt assumed authority over the family, arranged a
polygamous marriage for the applicant against her will, and planned to have the
applicant circumcised before the marriage was consummated. See id. (considering
claim of persecution). The applicant fled Togo, passing through Ghana and Ger-
many and eventually arriving in the United States where she immediately sought
asylum. See id. (discussing applicant's escape from persecution); see also Franke,
supra note 37, at 617 (suggesting BIA's acknowledgement of FGM as society-en-
dorsed practice).
42. See Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365 (recognizing FGM as persecution
claimed by particular social group); see also Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 113 n.20
(2d Cir. 2008) (considering BIA decision to include opposition to FGM in defini-
tion of eligible particular social group). But see Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662,
666 (9th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that Kasinga holding did not answer question of
whether gender and specific country of origin are together sufficient to show par-
ticular social group).
43. See Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 365-66 (analyzing particular social group
(citing Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds
by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987))). But see Donchev v.
Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1216 n.33, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing and claiming
deference to Kasinga while insisting that immutable characteristic test is necessary
but not independently sufficient).
44. See Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 366-67 (accepting nexus based on use of
FGM to control female sexual identity); see also In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 912
(B.I.A. 2001) (holding that basis of nexus is connection between immutable char-
acteristic and group member's identity).
45. See Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 357-58 (noting parties' agreement on appli-
cant's qualification for asylum but disagreement over general eligibility of FGM
victims for asylum and declining to rule more broadly than present case). But see
Franke, supra note 37, at 612 (arguing that women's success in seeking asylum on
account of gender has been inconsistent).
46. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 912 (B.I.A. 2001).
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both significant scholarly response and heated public outcry.4 7 The asy-
lum applicant, a Guatemalan woman, was severely beaten by her husband
over the course of many years before she fled to the United States.48 The
immigration judge granted asylum based on the applicant's membership
in the group of "Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately
with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live
under male domination."4 9 Although the BIA acknowledged that the ap-
plicant was persecuted and that the Guatemalan government was unable
or unwilling to protect her, it nonetheless reversed, finding her claim of a
particular social group insufficient to demonstrate asylum eligibility.50
Citing Ninth Circuit precedent, including Sanchez-Trujillo, the BIA re-
jected the applicant's claimed group.5 ' Focusing on two alternative crite-
47. See id. at 908 (describing factual basis of claim); see also Bryn D. Powell,
Domestic Violence, Gender-Related Asylum and In re R-A-, 13 BUFF. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 6-7
(2006) (suggesting that public support for applicant has forced government to
take action towards recognizing victims of domestic violence as qualifying for
asylum).
48. See R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 908 (noting abuse suffered by applicant).
Throughout their marriage, the applicant's husband indicated his understanding
of the applicant's role as his wife by escorting the applicant to work, refusing to
allow her to be alone, scaring her into submission by telling stories of killing babies
and the elderly during military service, insisting that she accompany him to canti-
nas and striking her for trying to leave, assaulting her and dislocating herjaw when
her menstrual period was late, kicking her in the spine when she refused to abort a
pregnancy, raping her almost daily and striking her before and during unwanted
sex, kicking her in the genitalia and forcibly sodomizing her, and physically and
verbally abusing her in both public and private settings for any or no reason. See
id. (considering basis for persecution element of asylum claim). Justifying these
attacks, the applicant's husband responded, "[y]ou're my woman, you do what I
say." See id. (internal quotation omitted) (recounting applicant's testimony regard-
ing persecution). The police issued several summonses when the applicant sought
their protection, but took no further action when her husband failed to appear,
considering this a domestic issue. See id. at 909 (discussing attempts to end
persecution).
49. See id. at 911 (considering holding by immigration judge). Specifically,
the immigration judge accepted as a cognizable and cohesive particular social
group "Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan
male companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination"
and whose persecuted members are victimized on account of their membership.
See id. (assessing immigration judge's basis for granting asylum); see also Daugherty,
supra note 34, at 644 (suggesting that immigration judge's finding was consistent
with emerging trends towards accepting gender-based claims).
50. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 914, 919 (expressing sympathy for applicant's
persecution but finding it insufficient to demonstrate eligible particular social
group). The BIA also considered the applicant's claim that she was persecuted on
account of imputed political opinion that women ought not be dominated by men.
See id. at 916-17 (discussing claim of imputed political opinion as grounds for re-
lief). Despite conceding that the general proposition that the persecuted do not
want to be persecuted, the BLA did not accept this construction as an eligible
ground for asylum relief. See id. (rejecting claim). For a discussion of the doctrine
of imputed political opinion and its application, see Yoo, supra note 7.
51. See R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 917-18 (considering Ninth Circuit precedent
but holding that outcome of case would apply beyond Ninth Circuit as well).
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ria-voluntary association and social perception-the BIA found that the
group was not a particular social group but rather a listing of characteris-
tics that a certain group of individuals happened to share.5 2 Implying a
floodgates argument, the BIA suggested that such a liberal construction of
the particular social group requirement would render the requirement
meaningless.5 3 Moving beyond whether a cognizable particular group ex-
isted, the BIA held that the facts of R-A- provided insufficient evidence
that the applicant's husband persecuted her on account of her member-
ship in that group.5 4 Thus, the BIA denied asylum.5 5
Recognizing similarities between Kasinga and R-A-, the BIA sought to
distinguish the cases without adopting a different standard.5 6 The court
cited Kasinga for the uncontroversial premise that an immutable charac-
teristic is necessary to form a particular social group and that the persecu-
tion must be on account of membership in the group.5 7 The BIA also
considered Kasinga at the outset of its discussion of whether a cognizable
particular social group was present, but immediately criticized the poten-
52. See id. at 918-19 (focusing on lack of recognition by Guatemalan society of
proposed group). Qualifying its rhetoric, the BIA acknowledged that the immuta-
ble characteristic must be the starting point of the particular social group analysis
but that an immutable characteristic alone is insufficient. See id. at 919 (setting
forth particular social group analysis (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211
(B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439
(B.I.A. 1987))); see also Shanyn Gillespie, Note, Terror in the Home: The Failure of US.
Asylum Law to Protect Battered Women and a Proposal to Right the Wrong of In re R-A-, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 131, 144 (2003) (noting BIA's acknowledgement of Acosta pre-
cedent and failure to offer justification for new test in R-A-). For a discussion of
social visibility and voluntary association, see infra notes 81-121 and accompanying
text.
53. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 919 (arguing that too broad interpretation
would "swallow" refugee definition); Gillespie, supra note 52, at 144 (suggesting
that BIA mentions risk of diluting refugee definition as justification for new, unjus-
tified test); see also Binder, supra note 24, at 184 (suggesting BIA distinguished R-A-
because domestic violence is so prevalent).
54. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 920-21 (noting that applicant's husband only
persecuted applicant, not other members of claimed group). In analyzing the
nexus requirement for asylum, the BIA found that the applicant's husband had
abused her as an individual, not because of anything she believed or because she
was a woman. See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1203 (discussing nexus analysis by
BIA); see also Megan Annitto, Comment, Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence: Is
Protection Possible After In re R-A-?, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 785, 806 (2000) (suggesting
analysis skewed court from engaging persecution correctly); Franke, supra note 37,
at 615 (suggesting that Ninth Circuit precedent from Sanchez-Trujillo permitted R-
A- to be decided more quickly through substantial discussion but indicating move-
ment away from this precedent).
55. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. at 927-28 (denying asylum).
56. See id. at 925 (referencing apparent tension with Kasinga); see also Binder,
supra note 24, at 184-85 (noting broad effect of R-A- in narrowing Kasinga applica-
bility). But see Annitto, supra note 54, at 810 (arguing that BIA used same factors in
both decisions).
57. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 912, 920 (citing In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec.
357 (B.I.A. 1996), and other cases for basic premise).
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tial result.58 Defending its holding, the BIA insisted that Kasinga did "not
prescribe a different result."5 9 The common characteristic of not having
suffered FGM and resisting FGM was an identifiable attribute causing ani-
mosity and therefore created a cognizable social group.6 0 On the other
hand, suffering domestic violence was not an attribute that could create a
particular social group.6 1 Thus, even where female asylum seekers could
show persecution solely on account of being women, no relief was availa-
ble under the BIA's R-A- holding.62
In response to the public outcry over the BIA's rejection of the appli-
cant's asylum claim in R-A-, Attorney General Janet Reno granted a stay of
removal to the applicant and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsider-
ation." This stay was eventually lifted, however, and no conclusive action
was taken to change the law or to adopt new proposals to avoid this situa-
58. See id. at 919 (construing Kasinga narrowly to avoid undermining defini-
tion of refugee).
59. See id. at 924 (distinguishing Kasinga by arguing that persecution through
FGM was more prevalent, directed, and clearly government-endorsed than perse-
cution through domestic violence).
60. See id. at 924 (emphasizing pervasiveness of FGM in society, expectation of
compliance with practice, and government knowledge of and tacit support for
practice).
61. See id. at 925 (suggesting that, despite apparent similarities because harm
was inflicted by close family members, attribute causing domestic violence against
women "is a factor to be overcome if the group is to be accepted"); see also Daugh-
erty, supra note 34, at 644 (noting attempt to distinguish cases by focusing upon
societal recognition of attribute).
62. See Daugherty, supra note 34, at 647 (discussing proposed amendments
arising from R-A-). The amendments to 8 C.F.R. part 208 that were proposed as a
direct backlash to the BIA's holding in R-A- included explicit language such that
domestic violence victims could create a gender-based particular social group on
account of which they had been persecuted. See id. (arguing that amendments
were intended to create gender-based particular social group).
63. See R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 906 (staying deportation and remanding case to
BIA for reconsideration); Reimann, supra note 6, at 1204-05 (discussing unusual
trajectory this case followed because of public outcry and involvement of advocacy
groups).
The BIA exercises the discretionary authority given to the Attorney General
and, therefore, though unusual, a case may be certified to the Attorney General
for a final decision. See id. (discussing subsequent case history). After the BIA's
ruling in R-A-, considerable advocacy lead the INS to propose amendments to the
law governing asylum so that seekers of asylum based on gender-based persecution
would be more successful in their applications. See id. (considering proposed reso-
lution). Attorney General Janet Reno exercised her authority to review R-A- and
ordered a temporary stay until such amendments could be finalized. See id. at 1205
(suggesting proposed amendments would benefit victimized women). But see Gil-
lespie, supra note 52, at 146-47 (suggesting that proposed amendments would not
benefit domestic violence victims).
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tion in the future.6 4 Finally, in 2009, an immigration judge granted asy-
lum to the applicant in R-A-.6 5
R-A- notwithstanding, the Ninth Circuit significantly altered its ap-
proach to adjudicating particular social groups in 2000 with its opinion in
Hernandez-Montiel v. LN.S.6 6 In this case, the Ninth Circuit considered an
appeal of the BIA's denial of asylum based on membership in the particu-
lar social group of "gay men in Mexico with female sexual identities."6 7
The court considered Sanchez-Trujillo, which required a voluntary associa-
tional relationship, and yet suggested the family as the prototypical exam-
ple of a particular social group. 6  Noting that these two holdings are at
least in tension with one another, if not in direct contrast, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a particular social group "is one united by a voluntary associ-
ation, including a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is
so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that mem-
bers either cannot or should not be required to change it."69 Applying
64. See Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec 629, 629-30 (A.G. 2008) (acknowledging
that no decision directly answering issue for which stay was granted had been
promulgated but that BIA should reconsider case in light of other interceding
rules and decisions). No action was taken by the subsequent Administration to
finalize the proposed INS amendments so the state of gender-based claims, and
the future of the applicant in R-A-, remained uncertain. See Reimann, supra note 6,
at 1205 (considering government response to case).
65. See Documents and Information on Rody Alvarado's Claim for Asylum in the U.S.,
CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/campaigns/
alvarado.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (announcing grant of asylum to applicant
on December 10, 2009).
66. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gon-
zales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009); see Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1171
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that, in light of Hernandez-Montiel, Attorney General can-
not argue that homosexuals do not constitute particular social group); Amy R.
Bowles, Recent Case, Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000), 9
AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. Pot'v & L. 717, 722-23 (2001) (noting importance of case
for future asylum applicants). But see Daugherty, supra note 34, at 632 (noting that
effect of Hernandez-Montiel is unclear).
67. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087 (considering basis of appeal). This
case involved a gay man who recognized his attraction to men at a young age and
identified himself as having a female identity and was thus expelled from school,
sexually assaulted by police officers on two occasions because of his sexual identity,
and, for the same reason, attacked by strangers. See id. at 1097-98 (discussing basis
of persecution element). The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's finding that
the applicant did not prove his claim for asylum. See id. at 1089-90 (affirming im-
migration judge).
68. See id. at 1092 (noting that only Ninth Circuit has adopted voluntary asso-
ciation requirement, that First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have adopted Acosta
immutability test, and admitting that family relationships are inherently involun-
tary); see also Sarah Siddiqui, Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group: All Ap-
proaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 Aiz. L. REv. 505, 514 (2010) (noting
admission by Ninth Circuit that family relationships are not voluntary and thus
seem to conflict with voluntary associational requirement).
69. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1092-93 (citing Lwin v. I.N.S., 144 F.3d 505,
512 (7th Cir. 1998)) (holding that Ninth Circuit test is inherently contradictory
and thus finding that two tests are alternatives); see Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d
[Vol. 56: p. 327340
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this test to the group of homosexual men with female sexual identities, the
court found that sexual identity was fundamental to the individuals' identi-
ties and that the group members were united by this shared identity. 70
The next significant step taken by the Ninth Circuit in the trend to-
wards recognizing gender-based particular social groups was in Mohammed
v. Gonzales." Here, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a Somali victim
of FGM was eligible for asylum or other humanitarian relief.7 2 Recogniz-
ing the similarity to Kasinga, the court held that the applicant could have
claimed persecution based on membership in a narrowly defined group:
940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that disjunctive definition alleviates tension
from Sanchez-Trujillo).
70. See Hernandez-Montie4 225 F.3d at 1094 (holding that Sanchez-Trujillo test is
met and that, as matter of law, "gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico"
are eligible particular social group for asylum law); see also Sarah Hinger, Finding
the Fundamental: Shaping Identity in Gender and Sexual Orientation Based Asylum
Claims, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 367, 393-94 (2010) (suggesting that Ninth Cir-
cuit went beyond ordinarily recognized groups in American society and that gen-
der and sexual identity are inherently linked in defining groups).
The court additionally held that the applicant needed to prove that his sexual
identity was merely a significant factor motivating persecution, not the only factor.
See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1096 (finding that applicant had sufficiently
shown that persecution was on account of his sexual identity). The government
argued that the applicant was persecuted because he dressed like a woman (a char-
acteristic he was free to change), not because of his sexual identity. See id. at 1089-
90, 1096 (considering BIA's finding against applicant because persecution arose
based on his voluntary dressing as female). The Ninth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, holding that dressing as a female is merely an outward manifestation of the
applicant's sexual identity and thus persecution was on account of the sexual iden-
tity being displayed. See id. at 1096 (rejecting BIA's conclusion on nexus require-
ment and clarifying particular social group definition to specify female identity
rather than female fashion); see also Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 785 n.1
(9th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging connection between identity and outward appear-
ance in society (citing Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d 1084)).
71. 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005); see Anker, supra note 5, at 202 (noting that
Mohammed moved asylum jurisprudence toward acceptance of gender claims gen-
erally, but reminding adjudicators that establishment of applicable particular so-
cial group does not alone qualify individual member of that group for asylum
relief).
72. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 789 (summarizing basis for claim and issues to
be considered by court). In addition to considering the merits of the applicant's
claim, the Ninth Circuit had to consider whether to permit reopening of the case.
See id. (noting first issue on appeal). The BIA denied her previous application for
asylum. See id. (describing case history). The applicant had not, however, origi-
nally included in her application that she had been the victim of FGM or that her
past persecution was upon this harm suffered. See id. (discussing applicant's first
asylum application). She subsequently hired a new lawyer and claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel in her original application. See id. (discussing complication in
that documents by applicant were actually contradictory as to whether or not she
had suffered FGM). After discussing the merits of her asylum claim, the Ninth
Circuit directed the BIA to grant her motion to reopen. See id. at 802-03 (finding
that applicant had in fact been prejudiced in her application by ineffective assis-
tance of counsel).
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"young girls in the Benadiri clan."7 3 The court, however, proposed the
alternative idea that Somali females may constitute the particular social
group because FGM is widespread in Somalia and is forced upon women
of many clans.74
The court mentioned no precedential bar to recognizing the group
of all Somali women.7 5 In suggesting this broader particular group as a
possibility, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit had not previously de-
cided whether women of a particular nationality or clan, or women gener-
ally, could constitute a particular social group.76 The court concluded,
however, that recognizing such a broad particular social group was "simply
a logical application of our law."77
By considering Acosta's immutable characteristic test and Hernandez-
Montiel's disjunctive language, the court avoided discussion of the tension
of its holding with Sanchez-Trujillo.78 The court further justified its new
approach to gender-based claims by citing international guidelines to asy-
lum and refugee adjudication that recognize the potential for women to
constitute particular social groups.7 9 Thus, the Ninth Circuit seemed to
73. Id. at 796-97 (citing In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 367-78 (B.I.A.
1996)). The court noted, however, that the Kasinga board's emphasis on the appli-
cant's opposition to FGM was not required; the persecution occurs not because a
woman opposes FGM but because she is a woman. See id. at 797 n.16 (rejecting
Kasinga board's emphasis on opposition); see also Carrie Acus Love, Note, Unrepeat-
able Harms: Female Genital Mutilation and Involuntary Sterilization in U.S. Asylum Law,
40 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 173, 192-93 (2008) (noting Ninth Circuit's rejection
of persecution in form of FGM in Mohammed broadened accessibility to asylum
relief).
74. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797 (noting that FGM is deeply embedded in
Somali culture and affects ninety-eight percent of Somali women); see also Aubra
Fletcher, Note, The REAL ID Act: Furthering Gender Bias in U.S. Asylum Law, 21
BERKELEYJ. GENDER L. &JusT. 111, 116 (2006) (suggesting that Mohammed is signif-
icant break from tendency towards restrictive recognition of broad gender-based
groups).
75. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797 (citing Hernandez-Montiel as permitting ex-
tension of particular social group status to all Somali women).
76. See id. at 797 n.17 (omitting any contrary precedent but citing Fisher v.
IN.S., 79 F.3d 955, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), for holding that issue had not
yet been decided).
77. See id. at 797 (extending recognition to gender-based claims); see also
Hinger, supra note 70, at 375-76 (noting that, despite apparently simple distinction
between men and women, more dynamic understanding of gender is necessary to
show that persecution against women actually occurs on account of their gender).
78. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797 (supporting holding by citing only to Mat-
ter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987), and Hernandez-Montiel v. IN.S., 225
F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409
F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009), but not Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir.
1986)); see also Anker, supra note 5, at 205-06 (suggesting that Mohammed decision
attempted to correct Ninth Circuit's opinion in Sanchez-Trujillo).
79. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 798 (referencing guidelines promulgated by
UNHCR).
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allow the possibility of women constituting a particular social group with-
out definitively closing the discussion.8 0
III. WHAT COUNTS? THREE POSSIBILITIES FOR DEFINING A COGNIZABLE
PARTICULAR SocIA.L GROUP
By fundamentally changing the basis for refugee and asylee status,
twentieth century international law left ambiguous the question of who
qualifies for relief.81 The 1951 United Nations Convention, through its
1967 Protocol, intentionally linked an individual's eligibility for refugee
status to the individual's identity, as opposed to a specific conflict, as was
previously the case in international law.82 Candidates for asylum had to
prove more than mere persecution.8 3 The five protected grounds, includ-
ing membership in a particular group, reserved asylum protection for
those suffering persecution because of their identity.84 Each participant
in the Convention was responsible for defining, through legislation, how
the particular social group category would be applied.85
80. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that
Mohammed recognized young girls of certain clan as eligible particular social group
without expressly recognizing women generally).
81. See Fullerton, supra note 16, at 561-62 (comparing varying applications of
international definition in Germany, Canada, and United States).
82. See Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group
as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 39, 42-45 (1983) (noting
that inclusion of particular social group was intended to protect previously unpro-
tected groups but that these groups still had to share some qualifying identity); see
also Fullerton, supra note 16, at 506-07, 506 nn.5-7 (discussing early international
attempts to protect refugees focusing on specific national or ethnic groups). The
1951 Convention is generally seen as having adopted a universal definition of refu-
gee that would apply beyond contemporary conflicts, but parties to the Conven-
tion were unwilling to extend protection to refugees worldwide and were thus
permitted to geographically limit their domestic application of the new refugee
definition to Europe. See Daniel Compton, Recent Case, Asylum for Persecuted Social
Groups: A Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar-Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571 (9th
Cir. 1986), 62 WASH. L. REv. 913, 924-26 (1987) (discussing controversy over geo-
graphic limitation versus universal application of definition and Convention-saving
compromise that allowed each state to adopt optional geographic limitation).
83. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
"Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article JA(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1 14, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Protection Guidelines] (emphasizing
that fact that individual or group of individuals has been persecuted does not es-
tablish that individual or group as particular social group).
84. See id. It 3-4 (insisting that particular social group cannot be understood
to be "catchall" such that other four categories are superfluous but conceding that
term can and should evolve).
85. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 211 (B.I.A. 1985) (noting that
United States law is based upon international protocol but that it is responsibility
of each state to define application of protocol), overruled on other grounds by Matter
of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); see also Fullerton, supra note 16,
at 510-11 (discussing varied approaches to domestic codification of international
agreement).
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Although lagging behind many other nations in adopting the interna-
tional protocol, the United States codified the international language in
1980.86 During the intervening years a number of scholars opined on how
particular social group eligibility would be applied, but the United States
Congress provided no clarification when passing the legislation that
adopted the international definition.8 7 Because United States immigra-
tion law is often decided by the BIA or the circuit courts rather than the
Supreme Court, various and conflicting tests have developed.8 8
A. Who You Are: Identity & Immutable Characteristics
The immutable characteristic test, the standard adopted by Acosta and
the dominant test in United States asylum law, is a logical and disciplined
application of the law and recognizes gender-based groups.89 As defined
by Acosta, this test takes a middle-ground approach, acknowledging that
the particular social group category was meant to expand relief beyond
the four enumerated grounds but not to allow application so broad that
the requirement becomes inconsequential.9 0 Fundamentally, this test re-
86. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting
United States ratification of international protocol in 1968 and subsequent codifi-
cation within United States law in 1980); Helton, supra note 82, at 39 (discussing
adoption by United States of international refugee definition in 1980 so as to pro-
vide flexible access to refuge).
87. See Sanchez-7rujillo, 801 F.2d at 1575-76 (noting that "legislative history is
generally uninformative on this point" and, therefore, courts have "looked to
sources of international law for guidance"); see also Fullerton, supra note 16, at 515-
20 (considering scholarly discussions of social group concept published between
adoption of international protocol and acceptance of international definition in
United States law); Helton, supra note 82, at 51 (noting, in 1983, "substantial body
of material discussing" new social group concept adopted by international
protocol).
88. See Fullerton, supra note 16, at 562 (discussing different approaches across
United States circuit courts of appeals); see, e.g., Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1239
(3d Cir. 1993) (holding that, in absence of clear legislative direction, circuit court
must defer to administrative agency and, therefore, must adopt immutable charac-
teristic test specified in Acosta); Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576 (requiring volun-
tary association amongst members of proposed group); Ananeh-Firempong v.
I.N.S., 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (requiring that members of proposed
group share common background, habits, or social status).
89. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 48-49, 52 (noting that Acosta defined seminal
test in United States jurisprudence after careful consideration of international pro-
tocol and that similar approaches have been adopted throughout common law
states). The Acosta test holds that members of a group share a common, immuta-
ble characteristic that they cannot change or should not be expected to change.
See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 212 (establishing test for determining existence of
particular social group). The BIA in Acosta acknowledged that Congress did not
indicate what exactly constitutes membership in a particular social group, but that
the understanding of a refugee described by the UNHCR is illustrative. See id. at
232-33 (considering international commentary on refugee definition). For a fur-
ther discussion of Acosta, see supra notes 30-33.
90. SeeJAmEs C. HATHAWAY, THE LAw OF REFUGEE STATUS 159-60 (1991) (not-
ing BIA's reliance upon median understanding of particular social group in Acosta
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lies upon the premise that the groups accepted as particular social groups
should be naturally similar to the other protected grounds. 1 Nonethe-
less, the test is broad enough to encompass natural-born characteristics,
shared identity based on common and unchangeable history, and volun-
tary identity that the possessor should not be forced or expected to
change.9 2 Applying this test without further qualification, gender-based
groups easily qualify as particular social groups.93
The United Nations has endorsed both the immutable characteristic
test and the implication that it permits gender-based groups, and many
nations have agreed.9 4 In providing guidelines on how the refugee defini-
tion should be interpreted, the UNHCR has been explicit that the immu-
table characteristic test is the first test and is sufficient on its own.95 In
concurrently published, gender-focused guidelines, gender was specifically
acknowledged as a qualifying basis for a particular social group.9 6 As a
but insisting that drafters only intended definition to address known harm, not
future harm, and, therefore, intentionally limited understanding of this term).
91. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 52 (arguing that, because particular social
group appears alongside other defined groups (race, religion, nationality, political
opinion), term must be similarly construed). The textualist analysis for under-
standing particular social group in this way is the doctrine of ejusdem generis. listed
as a group, the included categories must be fundamentally of the same kind. See
Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 233 (insisting that interpretation of particular social group
must be parallel to that of other enumerated grounds for protection); HATHAWAY,
supra note 90, at 161 (suggesting that, in addition to respecting drafters' intent,
this doctrine inherently connects refugee definition, including persecution, with
more widely understood concept of basic human rights); Marouf, supra note 8, at
52-53 (suggesting that application of this interpretive doctrine respects intention
of drafters by considering term in light of contemporary understanding of
refugee).
92. See HATHAWAY, Supra note 90, at 161 (suggesting that this understanding
of particular social group allows three different types of characteristics to qualify
but excludes "a characteristic which is changeable or from which dissociation is
possible").
93. See id. at 162 (displaying qualification of gender-based groups by citing
United Nations documents recognizing gender-based groups).
94. See Protection Guidelines, supra note 83, 6 (noting appropriateness of
widely accepted immutable characteristic test); see also Binder, supra note 24, at
175-76 (noting United Nations support for gender-based claims but previous am-
bivalence by United Nations and other international organizations in protecting
women from unique gender-based harm); Amanda Blanck, Note, Domestic Violence
as a Basis for Asylum Status: A Human Rights Based Approach, 22 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP.
47, 58 (2000) (highlighting various international protocols that seek to end dis-
crimination against women and protect various rights for victims of gender-based
violence).
95. See Protection Guidelines, supra note 83, 13 (noting that additional test of
social visibility should only be invoked when immutable characteristic test is not
met).
96. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, It 28-30, U.N. Doc. HCR/
GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Gender Guidelines] (instructing that gender
undoubtedly fulfills immutable characteristic test).
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result, the immutable characteristic test has become a norm in many com-
mon law countries and beyond.9 7
Protection for members of particular social groups is often seen as a
gap filler, but it does not soften the requirements for asylum.9 8 A group
recognized as a particular social group might overlap in some instances
with the other enumerated categories of protection.99 Characteristics that
merely join members of a proposed group, however, may not meet the
statutory requirements because they do not rise to the level of identity-
defining characteristics. 00
B. Who You Say You Are: Voluntary Association
The voluntary association test was created first as a limitation to the
immutable characteristic test, then became an alternative test, and now
has little, if any, role in asylum law. 1 The Ninth Circuit created the vol-
97. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 48-49 (noting adoption of immutable charac-
teristic test by major common law countries). Canadian law has adopted the im-
mutable characteristic test and allowed gender-based groups to qualify as
particular social groups. See, e.g., HATHAWAY, supra note 90, at 162 (citing Incir-
ciyan, Zeyiye v. M.E.I., IAB No. M87-1541X, M87-1248 (Aug. 10, 1987) (Can.)).
But see Fullerton, supra note 16, at 535 (noting that German courts have been in-
consistent in which test to use in evaluating claimed social group).
98. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985) (noting that
social group was understood to be broader than other four grounds to avoid gap in
coverage of persecuted persons), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi,
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); see also Fullerton, supra note 16, at 509 (noting
that inclusion of particular social group within refugee definition was addition sug-
gested by Swedish delegation to cover those who deserve protection but would
otherwise go unprotected).
99. See Protection Guidelines, supra note 83, 1 4 (stating that protected grounds
need not be mutually exclusive).
100. See id. (noting that application of particular social group protection can-
not leave other requirements of refugee definition superfluous); see, e.g., Gomez v.
I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in
rejecting claim of persecuted El Salvadoran woman based on particular social
group of young women). In Gomez, the applicant had fled El Salvador after being
raped as a young teenager by guerilla combatants. See id. at 662 (discussing basis of
asylum claim). Citing primarily precedent from the Ninth Circuit, including
Sanchez-Trujillo, the Second Circuit affirmed the BIA's rejection of the applicant's
claim on the basis that "broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will
not" constitute a particular social group. See id. at 664 (qualifying immutable char-
acteristic test). The court here did not add an additional social visibility or volun-
tary associational test as the Ninth Circuit had done but instead held that the
indistinguishable characteristic must distinguish the group members in the eye of
the persecutor. See id. (referring to nature of characteristics in other four pro-
tected groups). The Second Circuit, while acknowledging that the applicant had
been persecuted, found that she had failed to show that the claimed particular
social group was integrally related to the persecution she suffered. See id. (discuss-
ing failed asylum claim).
101. See Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)
(adopting disjunctive language when referring to voluntary association test and
recognizing immutable characteristic as independently sufficient), overruled on other
grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009); Sanchez-Trujillo v.
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untary association test in Sanchez-Trujillo to prevent a group of otherwise
unconnected individuals who happened to share unchangeable character-
istics from claiming membership in a particular social group. 10 2 The
court created a two-tiered test requiring the recognition of a qualifying
characteristic followed by an association of the possessors of that charac-
teristic.1 03 The same court rejected this two-tiered system in Hernandez-
Montiel.1 0 4 Rather than overrule precedent, however, the court held that
voluntary association could replace the required characteristic.1 05
Requiring voluntary association both directly and intentionally under-
mines gender-based claims.10 6 Women who are victimized because they
are women have not necessarily associated with any other women, victim-
ized or not (and some abuse includes preventing association with other
women). 0 7 After gradually broadening the application of particular so-
cial groups to encompass groups based on sexual identity or victims of
I.N.S, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (establishing voluntary association re-
quirement); Siddiqui, supra note 68, at 514 (noting that application of voluntary
association test changed from Sanchez-Trujillo to Hernandez-Montiel).
102. See Siobhan M. Kelly, Comment, Social Group-Based Asylum Claims Under
the Refugee Act of 1980, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 895, 913 (2000) (focusing on tension
between voluntary association requirement and former emphasis on immutable
characteristic and arguing that result contradicts precedent by logically excluding
family groups from social group definition); see also Anjana Bahl, Home Is Where the
Brute Lives: Asylum Law and Gender-Based Claims of Persecution, 4 CARDozo WOMEN'S
L.J. 33, 49 (1997) (criticizing Ninth Circuit for adopting voluntary association test
to intentionally restrict application of definition of refugee and then failing to
appropriately apply newly created definition).
103. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576-77 (recognizing that suggested mem-
bers of claimed particular social group share certain characteristics but finding
that group is too heterogeneous to constitute cognizable group as contemplated
by refugee definition).
104. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093 (replacing previous, two-tiered
requirement with disjunctive test).
105. See id. at 1093 n.6 (acknowledging former tension between Acosta and
Sanchez-Trujillo and seeking to reconcile two decisions by creating alternative tests);
see also Jenny-Brooke Condon, Comment, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33 SETON
HALL L. REv. 207, 243-44 (2002) (considering "plain language" of opinion). The
author notes that the UNHCR endorsed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the two
tests are alternatives to recognizing a particular social group and explicitly ac-
knowledged that a social group might exist "even if its members do not share an
immutable characteristic." See id. at 244 (discussing alternative tests).
106. See Condon, supra note 105, at 243 (acknowledging that gender is explic-
itly recognized as grounds for particular social group but that this recognition has
been qualified by six-factor test evaluating immutable characteristic and proposed
particular social group for cohesiveness and social visibility once it has been estab-
lished); see also Deborah Anker, Lauren Gilbert & Nancy Kelly, Women Whose Gov-
ernments Are Unable or Unwilling to Provide Protection from Domestic Violence May Qualify
as Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMICR. L.J. 709, 745 (1997)
(arguing that requiring that women show gender plus additional element to estab-
lish particular social group raises equal protection concerns).
107. See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908 (B.I.A. 2001) (finding that
abusive husband insisted that victim "accompany him wherever he went" and
would "wait to direct her home"); see also Anker, supra note 106, at 743 (arguing
that, in societies where violence against women is tolerated, women are subjected
347
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FGM, the incongruence of a voluntary association requirement becomes
clear. 0 8 In addition, the UNHCR has explicitly rejected such a
requirement.109
C. Who They Say You Are: Social Visibility
In a pair of recent cases, the BIA added a new test to the particular
social group analysis that, while only properly understood as an alterna-
tive, was used by the BIA as an additional requirement.o1 0 As applied by
the BIA, the social visibility test looks not only for an immutable character-
istic but also asks whether society "perceives" the proposed group to be a
social group.' The BIA implemented this analysis under the guise of an
extension of the Acosta inquiry without acknowledging it as a break from
to violence simply because they are women and, therefore, meet social group re-
quirement through isolated victimization).
108. See Fullerton, supra note 16, at 555-57 (discussing Sanchez-Trujillo's volun-
tary association requirement and arguing that it creates tension with immutable
characteristic requirement, especially in relation to stated paradigmatic group ex-
ample of family).
109. See Protection Guidelines, supra note 83, 1 6 (clarifying that immutable
characteristic test alone is sufficient to recognize social group and that recognition
of gender-based groups under this application is appropriate); see also Karen
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying Ratio-
nale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 777, 804 (2003) (referencing ex-
plicit rejection of Sanchez-Trujillo voluntary association requirement).
110. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 63 (discussing application by BIA of social
visibility test in cases of In re C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 951, 951-52 (B.I.A. 2006), and In
re A-M-E- &J-G-U, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69, 73 (B.I.A. 2007)). In C-A-, on remand from
the Eleventh Circuit, which had found that the respondents were persecuted on
account of their identity as noncriminal informants, the BIA determined whether
"noncriminal informants" could constitute a particular social group. See C-A-, 23 I.
& N. Dec. at 951-52 (explaining basis of decision). In considering the case, the
BIA held that requirements beyond the Acosta test, such as voluntary association or
cohesiveness, are generally not necessary but that social perception is a factor in
recognizing a social group. See id. at 957 (reviewing various approaches taken by
circuits and by international community). The BLA conceded that a shared his-
tory, which was claimed by the respondents, is an unchangeable characteristic, but
the BIA then considered social visibility and rejected the claim, finding that the
cited group was not socially visible. See id. at 959-60 (finding that no qualifying
particular social group had been shown).
In A-M-E- &J-G-U-, on remand from the Second Circuit, the BIA addressed
the question of why "affluent Guatemalans" could not constitute a particular social
group eligible for asylum relief. See A-M-E- &J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73 (discuss-
ing basis for remand from Second Circuit). Although the BIA initially asserted
that affluence is not an immutable characteristic, the BIA admitted that divestiture
would not be expected and immediately turned to the issue of social visibility. See
id. at 73-74 (affirming finding of immigration judge that affluence is not immuta-
ble characteristic). Citing C-A-, the BIA insisted that social visibility is an essential
element of social group analysis and that social perception is important in recog-
nizing the group as eligible for asylum relief. See id. at 74 (quoting C-A- as unequiv-
ocal on issue of social visibility as essential).
111. See Siddiqui, supra note 68, at 513 (citing BIA's decision in C-A- and its
application of new social visibility test).
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precedent.' 1 2 In reality, however, this test contradicts two decades of im-
migration jurisprudence without either statutory justification or interpre-
tive analysis.1 13 Requiring that a particular social group be perceived by
society generally would invalidate many groups already recognized by the
BIA as eligible for asylum protection, such as FGM victims.114
The international community accepts the social visibility test with very
limited application.' 1 5 Although initially focused on the immutable char-
acteristic test, the UNHCR recognized that some persecuted social groups
might face persecution based on a shared changeable characteristic and,
therefore, allowed social visibility as an alternative." 6 Thus, social visibil-
ity is understood not to be a limiting requirement but an additional quali-
fying ground.1 17
As applied to gender-based claims, the social visibility test would pre-
vent many eligible victims from receiving asylum relief. 1 8 Where violence
against women as women is tolerated, authorities generally view this vio-
lence as a private matter with which they will not interfere.'1 9 The vio-
112. See A-M-E- &J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73-74 (applying social visibility test
as extension of Acosta); C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957 (applying social visibility test as
continuation of Acosta test because Acosta test was not determinative).
113. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 68 (arguing not only that social visibility is
unprincipled break from precedent, but also that, because this test is contrary to
standing precedent, courts ought not apply social visibility test). But see Michael G.
Heyman, Asylum, Social Group Membership and the Non-State Actor: The Challenge of
Domestic Violence, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORmI 767, 783-84 (2003) (arguing that, in fact,
social perception is-and should be-consequential for asylum law because analy-
sis through eyes of persecutor is indicative of who is truly persecuted).
114. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996) (applying
Acosta and recognizing gender and tribal membership as independently sufficient
without looking to social perception of members of proposed group); see also
Hinger, supra note 70, at 379-80 (suggesting unique recognition of FGM as
grounds for asylum even though social group is unclear).
115. See Protection Guidelines, supra note 83, 1 13 (permitting investigation into
social perception of suggested social group only after determination that charac-
teristic uniting social group is changeable and, therefore, insufficient to meet
Acosta standard).
116. See id. (noting that even though defining characteristics of social group
may not be immutable, social perception may still allow recognition of that group
despite lack of independently qualifying characteristic).
117. See id. (providing example of how social perception test could widen pos-
sibility of eligibility for relief); see also Marouf, supra note 8, at 103-04 (claiming that
social visibility test as applied by BIA is sharp break from precedent and muddles
international community's understanding of role that social visibility is to play).
118. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 89, 91 (stating that gender is inherently im-
mutable and should qualify for asylum relief but noting asylum adjudicators' ten-
dency to find opportunities to reject gender-based claims and that social visibility
test will provide officials with new, unprincipled basis for rejecting gender-based
asylum claims).
119. See Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of
United States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 28 (1998) (acknowledging hesitance by international com-
munity to recognize gender-based claims because of breadth of potential social
group but noting that women around world are subject to violence that is ignored
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lence is veiled by socially accepted silence.120 Thus, it may be impossible
to show that society perceives the persecuted to be a social group because
society intentionally ignores them.12 1
IV. OPENING THE FLOODGATES OR FILLING THE GAP?
A. An Unprincipled Rejection: Gender as the Floodgate
Reluctance by the United States to recognize gender-based asylum
claims is largely a result of the unfounded fear that allowing eligibility for
women persecuted as women will immediately inundate the United States
with asylees. 122 Ideologically, courts have claimed concern that the inten-
tionally narrow definition of a refugee will be lost if gender is recognized
as a basis for a particular social group because everyone will qualify. 2 3
More pragmatically, judges and policy makers have argued that there
would simply be too many women who qualify for asylum if such recogni-
tion were permitted. 124
Emphasis on the size of the social group is misplaced.125 Appropriate
interpretation of the refugee definition does not require that a particular
social group be a small category but actually suggests that it is a very large
by authorities and that recognition of such groups is women's opportunity for
relief).
120. See Heyman, supra note 113, at 804 (suggesting that domestic violence is
generally misunderstood and that, because domestic violence is considered by soci-
ety to be private concern limited to private sphere, attempts at legal intervention
have been limited or unsuccessful).
121. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918-19 (B.I.A. 1999) (recognizing that
"respondent has shown that women living with abusive partners face a variety of
legal and practical problems in obtaining protection or in leaving the abusive rela-
tionship" but finding that respondent has not proven her eligibility for asylum
relief because "respondent has not shown that 'Guatemalan women who have
been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that wo-
men are to live under male domination' is a group that is recognized and under-
stood to be a societal faction, or is otherwise a recognized segment of the
population, within Guatemala").
122. See Mary M. Sheridan, Comment, In re Fauziya Kasinga: The United States
Has Opened Its Doors to Victims ofFemale Genital Mutilation, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 433,
457 (1997) (noting floodgates claim seems to be empirically unfounded and,
therefore, arguing that concerns about overwhelming asylum claims has served as
pretext for rejecting gender-based claims).
123. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (B.I.A. 1986) (quoting
immigration judge's concern over recognizing overly large group); Peter C. God-
frey, Note, Defining the Social Group in Asylum Proceedings: The Expansion of the Social
Group to Include a Broader Class of Refugees, 3J.L. & POL'v 257, 280-81 (1994) (citing
Sanchez-Trujillo and addressing concern that narrowly construed class of refugees
will be replaced by wide applicability for those dissatisfied with conditions of home
country).
124. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
BIA's apparent suggestion that percentage of population was sufficientjustification
for rejecting social group).
125. See Bahl, supra note 102, at 67 (rejecting appropriateness of considera-
tion of group size in determining if group member qualifies for relief).
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category parallel to race, religion, and nationality. 126 Additionally, con-
cern for the size of the group ignores the importance of other require-
ments for protection under asylum law.' 2 7 Recognition of a gender-based
particular social group does not grant blanket asylum to all women in the
cited country.128 Female victims of random criminal activity, for example,
would not be eligible for asylum.129 If an immigration judge finds that a
female asylum applicant was victimized through an individualized attack,
unrelated to her identity as a woman, the judge will not approve her claim
for asylum.130
Even if recognition of gender-based grounds would result in a signifi-
cant increase in asylum claims, adjudicators should nonetheless consider
only the individual claim.131 The merits of each case must be evaluated
individually and not upon the basis of the asylum system as a whole. 132
The pragmatic concern that there will be an influx of asylees is inappropri-
ate because asylees comprise only a small portion of immigrants to the
United States.13 3 After Kasinga, the Immigration and Nationality Service
126. See HATHAwAy, supra note 90, at 163 (noting that other enumerated
grounds for protection under refugee definition are very large groups).
127. See Bahl, supra note 102, at 70 (noting that once particular group has
been established, further inquiry into whether group has been persecuted and
whether individual asylum seeker has been or likely will be persecuted are appro-
priate and necessary inquiries before asylum will be granted).
128. See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1258-59 (noting that asylum seekers must
not simply prove sexual abuse but "severe sexual abuse" (thus rape might qualify
for asylum but unwanted sexual touching might not) and that each individual will
still have to prove, to satisfaction of asylum officer or immigration judge, that she
has experienced past harm or has well-founded fear of future harm).
129. See Condon, supra note 105, at 237 (emphasizing that other require-
ments for asylum, specifically that harm suffered (or feared) rise to level of "perse-
cution" and that harm is suffered "on account of" membership in particular social
group, must still be met in order for applicant claiming asylum to prevail).
130. See id. at 240 (recognizing that other grounds for asylum-e.g., persecu-
tion based on race, nationality, religion, and political opinion-can similarly allow
asylum adjudicators to differentiate between persecution on account of protected
grounds and random victimization of member of protected class).
131. See David L. Neal, Comment, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-
Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 203, 241
(1988) (emphasizing congressional intent in recognizing international refugee
definition in asylum law to permit individual adjudication and equity when consid-
ering asylum applications).
132. See Bahl, supra note 102, at 70 (arguing that floodgates argument inap-
propriately shifts emphasis away from merits of case and defeats spirit of asylum
law); John Linarelli, Violence Against Women and the Asylum Process, 60 ALB. L. REV.
977, 985 (1997) (noting that large number of males fleeing communist regimes
were quickly granted asylum during Cold War); Condon, supra note 105, at 232
(arguing that if asylum adjudicators are permitted to consider, when approving
individual applicant for asylum, number of similarly situated additional potential
applicants eligible for asylum, adjudicator's focus would be inappropriately shifted
away from honest interpretation of governing statute).
133. See Linarelli, supra note 132, at 984 (noting lack of increase in Canada
and small percentage of immigrants that are asylees); Sheridan, supra note 122, at
457 (noting that France and Canada, amongst others, recognize gender-based
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(INS) explicitly noted that the feared deluge of female asylum seekers did
not occur.134 If there is a problem, however, a statutory revision by Con-
gress should address it rather than incorrect interpretation by the
courts.13 5
B. An Honest Application: Gender as the Gap
The continued refusal to permit gender-based claims has created a
gap in United States asylum law that must be filled.'3 6 While appearing
gender-neutral, the refugee definition has been applied more liberally to
persecution commonly affecting men than to persecution unique to, or
concentrated against, women. 3 7 Adjudicators have been unwilling to rec-
ognize rape and other sexual assaults as persecution even when used ex-
plicitly to subjugate women, instead referring to them as personal
attacks.' 38 The international community has sought to rectify this gender-
biased application by acknowledgement of gender-specific issues.' 39
Nonetheless, the diverging interpretations by the United States courts and
the international community perpetuate this failure to protect women.' 40
Recognizing gender as a particular social group because it is an in-
nate characteristic that cannot be changed fits comfortably within the con-
structionist approach of Acosta and other precedent.141 Using the
claims and have not experienced overwhelming increases in asylees entering
country).
134. See Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Flood-
gates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 119, 132-33 (2007)
(noting empirical evidence disproving floodgates argument).
135. See Neal, supra note 131, at 242 (arguing that, if too many qualify for
asylum under correct interpretation of definition, Congress-not courts-must
change statute).
136. See Musalo, supra note 134, at 143 (arguing that recognizing asylum for
women who suffer human rights violations is philosophically consistent and legally
necessary to meet commitments made by United States after World War II); Bret
Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law Reform, 11 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 221, 238 (2000) (concluding, after considering trends in interna-
tional law towards recognition of gender-based claims, that promulgated guide-
lines do not go far enough in protecting women who are persecuted solely on
account of gender).
137. See Binder, supra note 24, at 169-71 (arguing that asylum law developed
split between masculine and feminine persecution, allowing men to be protected
but preventing women from seeking relief).
138. See Bahl, supra note 102, at 54-55 (noting inconsistency in application of
asylum law, especially considering apparent qualification for asylum based on polit-
ical opinion if persecuted woman expresses her opposition to male domination).
139. See Gender Guidelines, supra note 96, 1 2, 7 (considering as uncontrover-
sial that awareness of gender dimensions of persecution is necessary and insisting
that gender must be considered holistically in its application to refugees).
140. See Thiele, supra note 136, at 228 (noting different tests established by
United Nations, in its UNHCR Handbook, supra note 9, and Gender Guidelines, supra
note 96, and by United States courts).
141. See Marouf, supra note 8, at 49-50 (arguing that immutable characteristic
is principled application of definition while social visibility test is not).
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interpretive methods upon which Acosta was founded, if qualifying asylum
applicants are eligible because of membership in broadly defined groups
(identity as a member of a particular race, religion, or nationality), an
eligible particular social group should be similarly broad. 1 42 Instead, wo-
men have been forced to create narrowly defined social groups using
many characteristics; thus, the current understanding of a successful par-
ticular social group claim is not akin to the other enumerated grounds. 143
The concern should not be whether the particular social group is too
broad but rather whether the group is eligible under the correct applica-
tion of Acosta.'"
The United States has taken some steps towards recognizing the
unique claims by women for asylum.1 4 5 In a 1995 internal, unpublished
memorandum, the INS acknowledged that, "enhancing understanding of
and sensitivity to gender-related issues will improve U.S. asylum adjudica-
tion while keeping pace with these international concerns."1 4 6 Asylum ad-
judicators were informed of the different approaches taken by the circuit
courts towards gender-based claims but were instructed that the Third Cir-
cuit pronouncement that women can constitute a particular social group
is consistent with Acosta.147 Nonetheless, there has been general reluc-
tance by United States officials to recognize women as a particular social
group, leaving women fewer options to access asylum relief.'4 8
142. See Macklin, supra note 119, at 64-65 (applying this understanding to
gender by suggesting that gender is unchangeable characteristic by which individu-
als identify and that it is parallel to distinguishing racial or ethnic characteristic).
143. See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1202 (arguing that actions by officials in
United States rejecting gender alone as sufficient to establish particular social
group has caused paradoxical tendency, because women persecuted only because
they are women have had to propose increasingly narrow particular social groups
such that causal nexus required can no longer be proven).
144. See Anker, supra note 5, at 202 (suggesting that Mohammed indicates cor-
rect move by Ninth Circuit to return to careful application of Acosta standard).
145. See Linarelli, supra note 132, at 980 (suggesting that legitimate grounds
for asylum sought by women in hopes of eliminating gender bias contributed to
amendments to asylum law).
146. See Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't
ofJustice, to All INS Asylum Officers and HQASM Coordinators I (May 26, 1995),
repinted in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASEs 771 app. I (1995) (reflecting upon recent
developments in domestic and international understandings of gender-based asy-
lum claims).
147. See id. at 787 (recounting diverging approaches taken by circuit courts in
recent cases when confronted with claims for gender-based particular social
groups).
148. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010) (recount-
ing immigration judge's reasoning for rejecting petitioner's request for asylum re-
lief and BIA affirmation thereof).
353
27
Imbriano: Opening the Floodgates or Filing the Gap: Perdomo v. Holder Advan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
VILLANOVA ILAW REVIEW
V. TAKING THE NEXT STEP: Perdomo v. Holder
By publishing its decision in Perdomo, the Ninth Circuit added one
more crucial precedent to the analysis of gender-based asylum claims.1 4 9
The court directly considered whether women from a particular country-
Guatemala-can constitute a particular social group.1 50 The court did
not definitively answer the question, but after recounting three decades of
jurisprudence, it insisted upon the importance of the immutable charac-
teristic test.' 5 1 The implication of this holding is a new opportunity for
victims of gender-based persecution.15 2
A. Who Is Lesly Perdomo?
Lesly Perdomo is Guatemalan by birth, but American by experi-
ence.1 5 3 Born in Guatemala, she moved to the United States in 1991 at
age fifteen to join her mother.'5 4 She entered the United States without
inspection and without legal status.' 5 5 She has lived in the United States
since 1991, completing high school and building a life here.' 5 6 She no
longer has any family in Guatemala.' 5 7
149. See id. at 666 (noting that court's understanding of particular social
group "continues to evolve"); see also Gerald Seipp, A Year in Review: Social Visibility
Doctrine Still Alive, but Questioned, 87 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1417, 1423 (2010)
(characterizing Perdomo holding as "remarkable").
150. See Ninth Circuit Finds Guatemalan Women May Constitute a Particular Social
Group Eligible for Asylum, 87 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1427, 1427 (2010) [hereinafter
Ninth Circuit Finds] (concluding Ninth Circuit's holding that BIA decision was in-
consistent with BIA and Ninth Circuit precedent and thus remand is appropriate).
151. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666 (reviewing BIA and Ninth Circuit precedent
but noting that whether women in particular country can constitute particular so-
cial group "remains an unresolved question for the BIA").
152. See Seipp, supra note 149, at 1423 (noting expectation of developments
over whether Perdomo holding will be "extended to embrace women in other coun-
tries which can be accused of relegating women to an inferior status"); see also
Ruling on Women May Spur Asylum Claims, supra note 5, at AIO (suggesting that
Perdomo holding may allow many other individuals in similar circumstances to ar-
gue for asylum status).
153. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 664 (considering Perdomo's history and exper-
iences in United States).
154. See id. (recounting facts as found by BIA). Perdomo's mother had previ-
ously applied for and been denied asylum. See id. at 664 n.1 (discussing peti-
tioner's mother's application for asylum based on fear of being killed if forcibly
returned to Guatemala).
155. See id. at 664 (noting that Perdomo entered United States without in-
spection and without parole).
156. See id. (mentioning Perdomo's U.S. high school education, professional
employment as Medicaid account executive, and active participation in local Pen-
tecostal church).
157. See id. (considering Perdomo's family ties and noting that she is unmar-
ried and has no children, that her parents are deceased, and that she lives with her
stepfather and sister).
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In 2003, the INS ordered Perdomo to appear and charged her as re-
movable.158 Perdomo conceded that she was removable but immediately
sought asylum.15 9 Before the immigration court, Perdomo argued that, if
returned to Guatemala, she would be persecuted because of her extended
stay in the United States, her financial success, and her religious affilia-
tion, but primarily because she is a member of the social group of "women
between the ages fourteen and forty who are Guatemalan and live in the
United States."16 0 Perdomo admittedly had not suffered persecution, but
she presented evidence of the high rate of violence against and homicides
of Guatemalan women.'16
B. Who the Courts Saw
The immigration judge found Perdomo to be credible and truth-
ful.1 62 The judge nonetheless rejected Perdomo's request for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Tor-
158. See id. (discussing start of Perdomo's immigration proceedings). The
INS charged Perdomo as removable under INA § 212(a) (6) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006). See id. (noting basis for initiating immigration
proceedings).
According to United States law, "An alien present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place
other than as designated by the Attorney General is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (6) (A) (i). Removal proceedings are initiated when the Department of
Homeland Security files the Notice to Appear with the Immigration Judge. See
INA § 239(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (establishing means of beginning removal proceed- -
ings against alien illegally present in United States).
159. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 664 (acknowledging Perdomo's concession to
removability but fear of being forcibly returned to Guatemala). If an alien in re-
moval proceedings expresses fear of persecution upon return to the alien's coun-
try of origin, the immigration judge must explain to the alien the opportunity to
apply for asylum and provide the necessary forms. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c) (1)
(2011) (discussing opportunity to apply for asylum at outset of removal
proceedings).
160. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 664 (discussing Perdomo's basis for asylum
claim).
161. See id. (acknowledging that petitioner's claim for asylum is based not on
past persecution but fear of future persecution); see also Seipp, supra note 149, at
1423 (noting introduction of evidence of high rates of "femicide" in Guatemala).
The petitioner provided the immigration court with reports by the Guatema-
lan Human Rights Commission to demonstrate the attacks on and killings of wo-
men in Guatemala, the brutality of these atrocities, their pervasiveness, and the
lack of government response to them. See Ninth Circuit Finds, supra note 150, at
1427 (discussing documentation provided by petitioner to immigration court to
support her fear of future persecution). According to the U. S. Department of
State, violence against women remains a serious and widespread problem in Guate-
mala and many women do not report such violence for fear that the police will not
act. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2009 HuMAN RIGHTs REPORT: GUATEMAI..A (2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136114.htm (finding
pervasive violence against women still present in Guatemala).
162. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 664-65 (considering immigration judge's evalua-
tion of Perdomo's testimony).
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ture.16 3 The judge based the denial on the belief that Perdomo did not
qualify as being a member of a particular social group according to asylum
law.164
On appeal, the BIA considered and rejected the proposed particular
social group as too broad to qualify under asylum law.' 6 5 The BIA also
rejected the respondent's revised particular social group of "all women in
Guatemala."16 6 The BIA held that this group was even broader-a "demo-
graphic division rather than a cognizable social group under the INA"-
and upheld the immigration judge's denial of relief.16 7
C. The Ninth Circuit Clarifies the View
In its published decision granting the petition for review and remand-
ing the case to the BIA, the Ninth Circuit focused exclusively on women as
a particular social group.168 Following its own formulaic approach to such
questions, the court began by acknowledging the lack of clarity in the asy-
lum statute and ultimately looked to the oft-cited Acosta decision.169 Cit-
ing to the BIA application of Acosta, the court noted that a particular social
group should be understood as similar to the other protected grounds and
that "sex" was listed by the BIA as an example of a particular social
group.170 Acknowledging that the analysis is not so simply concluded, the
court noted the BIA's caveats that a group must have social visibility and
particularity, but not voluntary association, cohesiveness, or strict homoge-
163. See id. (mentioning immigration judge's claimed sympathy with Perdomo
because of legitimate but ineligible fear of future persecution).
164. See id. at 665 (recognizing immigration judge's belief that women cannot
constitute particular social group for asylum relief).
165. See id. (reviewing BIA holding on appeal).
166. See id. (considering basis of BIA affirmation of immigration judge's rul-
ing). For a discussion of the persecution faced by women generally in Guatemala,
see Reimann, supra note 6, at 1207-15.
167. See Ninth Circuit Finds, supra note 150, at 1427 (reviewing BIA opinion
and basis for denial of relief sought by petitioner).
168. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 665, 669 (acknowledging that whether proposed
social group is eligible for asylum relief is question of law to be reviewed de novo
but also that, according to agency rules, case should be remanded in first instance
to agency to make legal determination entrusted to it).
169. See id. at 665-66 (citing lack of clear direction given by statute for inter-
pretation of term); see, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding insufficient explanation in statute and thus looking to Acosta),
overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009);
Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1575-76 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasizing
attempt to look to international protocol for guidance and, finding insufficient
explanation, applying statutory interpretation); Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec.
211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985) (looking beyond statute for definition of particular social
group), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439
(B.I.A. 1987).
170. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666 (emphasizing immutable characteristic test
coined by Acosta).
[Vol. 56: p. 327356
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss2/4
2011] OPENING THE FLOODGATES OR FILLING THE GAP?
neity.17 1 Kasinga, the court noted, showed the BIA's willingness to recog-
nize women of a particular tribe as a particular social group.1 7 2 Whether
women of a particular country alone constitute a particular social group
remained an open question for the BIA. 73
The court then turned to its own case law.17 4 The court acknowl-
edged the exacting standard established by Sanchez-Trujillo, but also recog-
nized that this requirement was softened by Hernandez-Montiel."1 7  When it
applied this new standard in Mohammed, the court did not definitively hold
that women could constitute a particular social group; however, the court
noted that in Mohammed, recognizing women as a social group was the
only plausible result.' 7 6
Turning to Perdomo's request for review, the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered only whether the BIA erred in finding that "Guatemalan women"
could not constitute a particular social group.1 77 The court criticized the
BIA for relying on Sanchez-Trujillo without applying the Hernandez-Montiel
alternative.' 7 8 Characterizing Hernandez-Montiel as based upon Acosta, the
court reasoned that Hernandez-Montiel allowed broad and diverse groups to
qualify.' 79 Groups that were deemed ineligible because of breadth were
rejected not because of their size, but because of the insufficient unifying
characteristic.18 0 The court explicitly rejected a holding that a group
171. See id. (citing In re A-M-E- &J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), as
recognizing certain caveats on particular social groups but not others).
172. See id. (implying that Kasinga was demonstrative application of how limits
on particular social groups should and should not be used).
173. See id. (noting that question of whether women in particular country
"could constitute a protected social group remains an unresolved question for the
BIA").
174. See Seipp, supra note 149, at 1423 (noting court's review of Ninth Circuit
precedent and its recognition that females of particular clan had previously been
seen as particular social group).
175. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666 (admitting that Ninth Circuit was only circuit
requiring voluntary association required by Sanchez-Trujillo and implying that Her-
nandez-Montiel signified retreat from this position).
176. See id. (noting that Eighth Circuit agreed with and adopted approach
taken by Ninth Circuit in recognizing Somali females as particular social group).
177. See id. at 667-68 (referring to precedent in agency law that reviewing
court will only review grounds relied upon by agency and remand case to agency
for reconsideration in light of court's holding).
178. See id. at 668 (acknowledging that BIA applied Sanchez-Trujillo precedent
but insisting that new, two-pronged test under Hernandez-Montiel permits recogni-
tion of broad groups).
179. See id. (referencing previous Ninth Circuit decisions, in light of Her-
nandez-Montiel, as permitting groups such as homosexuals and gypsies).
180. See id. (distinguishing between Ninth Circuit's rejection of certain
broadly defined groups as failing to have qualifying immutable characteristic and
BIA's rejection of petitioner's claimed social group despite possession of poten-
tially qualifying immutable characteristic).
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might not qualify on percentage of the foreign population alone.1 8 1
Thus, the court remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether wo-
men can constitute a particular social group.' 82
D. An Even Clearer View
Asylum status was not meant to protect every person fleeing persecu-
tion, but those who qualify for protection cannot and should not be stag-
nant.'8 3 The international community has recognized that many
individuals, particularly women, who were not cognizable refugees in
1951, must be seen as such today.' 8 4 While respecting this delicate legal
balance, the Ninth Circuit stopped short of reaching a conclusion in the
debate over gender-based particular social groups, but the only "plausible"
outcome is that women should qualify for protection.1 85
The Ninth Circuit recognized that, for two decades, its own precedent
inappropriately limited eligibility for asylum relief.1 8 6 Other circuits have
similarly adopted their own varying and contradictory tests for determin-
ing what particular social groups can qualify.' 8 7 In light of the interna-
tional consensus and United States jurisprudence, however, the most
appropriate test is the undiluted immutable characteristic test established
181. See id. at 669 (citing previous Ninth Circuit reversal of BIA decision for
holding that proposed social group constituted too large percentage of foreign
country).
182. See Seipp, supra note 149, at 1423 (reviewing remand to BIA to deter-
mine first whether women in Guatemala can constitute particular social group and
second whether petitioner demonstrated fear on account of membership in that
group).
183. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666 (considering past precedent in evaluation of
gender-based claims and noting continued evolution of understanding of criteria);
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985) (recounting require-
ments for asylum and noting that asylum applicant must show both persecution
according to established burden of proof and statutory requirement of persecution
on account of enumerated grounds), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Moghar-
rabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
184. See Gender Guidelines, supra note 96, 1 1 (identifying directives as provid-
ing means for adjudicators to understand 1951 Convention with sensitivity to
needs of women).
185. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 667-68 (reasoning that Mohammed's recognition
of women of particular tribe as legitimate particular social group was only "plausi-
ble" holding when considering whether women can constitute particular social
group but acknowledging that agency rules require that case be remanded to BIA
first so that BIA has opportunity to review case in light of court's holding).
186. See id. at 666 (considering how Ninth Circuit's holding in Hernandez-Mon-
tiel had softened test created by Sanchez-Trujillo in part because Ninth Circuit was
only circuit with voluntary association requirement).
187. See id. (mentioning that Ninth Circuit is only circuit to require voluntary
association); Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting that Seventh Circuit has rejected voluntary association test as inconsistent
with Acosta), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th
Cir. 2009); see, e.g., Ananeh-Firempong v. .N.S., 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985)
(requiring that members of proposed group share common background, habits,
or social status).
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by Acosta.188 The Ninth Circuit correctly recognized the preeminence of
this test but must now permit its application.18 9
When gender-based persecution is found, women must be recognized
as a particular social group as envisioned by asylum law.190 The combined
influence of implicit and explicit discrimination against women among
political and legal systems and a culture of impunity for men who commit
gender-based crimes perpetuate violence against women, an ongoing
problem in Guatemala and many other countries.19 1 As a result, women
are victimized solely because, as women, they have been delegated to a
subordinate role that the male-dominated society has determined to be
unworthy of protection.19 2 The victims here share an immutable charac-
teristic fundamental to their identity that they cannot change-female-
ness-and they are persecuted on account of their membership in the
particular social group of women.' 93
Although the Ninth Circuit rhetorically deferred to the BIA's exper-
tise to determine whether women of a particular nationality can constitute
a particular social group, the court left the BIA very little to decide.19 4
The BIA must apply the immutable characteristic test and must consider
gender an immutable characteristic.1 9 5 The BIA cannot dilute this test
188. See Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that, in
absence of clear legislative direction, circuit court must defer to administrative
agency and thus adopt immutable characteristic test specified in Acosta).
189. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093, 1093 n.6 (adopting disjunctive
test allowing either immutable characteristic or voluntary association tests to be
applied but specifically acknowledging intentional harmonization between Ninth
Circuit precedent and Acosta analysis).
190. See Binder, supra note 24, at 194 (concluding that violence against wo-
men has been found to be pervasive violation of human rights and that, where
such violence continues to occur, states must adapt refugee laws to provide relief
to these women).
191. See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1200 (discussing endemic situation of vio-
lence against women in Mexico and resulting claims made by many of these wo-
men for asylum in United States); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 161
(discussing violence against women and lack of reporting and government re-
sponse in Guatemala).
192. See Reimann, supra note 6, at 1202, 1215 (implying that this situation
means that gender constitutes exactly kind of social group intended by asylum law
because Guatemalan women are persecuted because they are Guatemalan women,
thus nexus between group and persecution helps define group).
193. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005) (asserting that
women suffering victimization unique to women suffer such persecution on ac-
count of their identity as women).
194. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing prece-
dent that circuit court is obligated to remand case to be reviewed by BIA in light of
circuit court's holding (citing Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.
2004) (per curiam))).
195. See id. at 666-67 (indicating that preeminent test must be immutable
characteristic test, citing as support Hernandez-Montiel and past reliance in Moham-
med on U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) "Gender Guidelines"
and UNHCR guidelines (citing Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797-98; Hernandez-Montiel
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with additional requirements.' 9 6 Finally, the BIA cannot reject gender on
pragmatic or ideological grounds.' 9 7 Implying only one possible out-
come, the remand order seems little more than a procedural necessity.' 9 8
VI. TAKING THE PLUNGE
The current administration has signaled a new, supportive position
towards gender-based claims through its response to the ongoing Matter of
L-R-.1'9 In L-R-, the victim of two decades of domestic violence was denied
asylum based on a failure to establish membership in a statutorily pro-
tected group.20 0 Under President Obama's administration, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) filed a brief arguing that, while a
particular social group that is defined by the persecution suffered is imper-
missibly circular, a group defined by gender-status and societal subordina-
tion may be a cognizable social group.20 ' Thus, the government joined
with the asylum applicant in arguing that the case should be remanded to
the immigration court for reconsideration of her proposed social
v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v.
Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009))).
196. See id. at 669 (noting that BIA failed to appropriately apply two-pronged
test created by Hernandez-Montiel and that BIA contradicted its own precedent as
established by Acosta).
197. See id. (rejecting any inclusion of numerosity argument in basis for deny-
ing application of particular social group).
198. See id. (remanding case to BIA for consideration of this question after
impliedly holding that precedent from Hernandez-Montiel and Mohammed show that
women can constitute particular social group).
199. See Matter of L.R., CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.
uchastings.edu/campaigns/Matter%20of%2OLR.php, (last visited Oct. 8, 2010)
(discussing background of Matter of L-R- and effect of outcome on gender-based
asylum claims generally).
200. See id. (chronicling abuse suffered by victim in case but noting that immi-
gration judge accepted argument by opposing counsel that proposed social group
did not permit asylum protection). The victim, a Mexican woman, suffered contin-
ual sexual, physical, and emotional abuse at the hands of her common-law hus-
band. See id. (describing abuse suffered). She sought protection from the police
and courts but found none. See id. (noting that official sought to exploit victim's
suffering by demanding sex in return for protection). After being denied asylum
by the immigration judge, the victim appealed to the BIA, which requested supple-
mentary briefs addressing recent decision by the Attorney General to grant asylum
in R-A-. See Brief for Respondent at 2, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2010) (on file
with author) (noting request by BIA for supplemental filing to address impact of
R-A-).
201. See Dep't of Homeland Sec.'s Supplemental Br. at 11-16, Matter of L-R-
(B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009) (on file with author) (arguing that social group originally
proposed by respondent relied upon persecution for definition of group, which is
impermissibly circular, but that in certain situations victims of domestic violence
may share immutable characteristic because of status in society and thus may form
qualifying particular social group), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/
Redacted%20DHS%20brief%2Oon%20PSG.pdf.
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group.202 The applicant was subsequently granted asylum. 203 While the
willingness to recognize gender-based social groups is not binding on im-
migration courts, the agency's position is binding on asylum officers and
should be followed by other DHS attorneys in future proceedings. 20 4
There are still questions that must be answered before Ms. Perdomo
will be permitted to stay in the United States.2 05 Even if Guatemalan wo-
men can constitute a particular social group, the BIA may find that her
fear of future persecution is not on account of her membership in that
group.20 6 Her case provides hope, however, for women suffering persecu-
tion around the world on account of their identity as women.207
There is a general trend throughout the circuit courts towards af-
firming the pure Acosta framework and making way to allow gender alone
to define a particular social group.208 The Ninth Circuit's recent rulings
prior to Perdomo had already seemed to silently overrule the precedent of
Sanchez-Trujillo.209 The Ninth Circuit has now directly ordered the BIA to
answer the question of whether gender-based social groups are cognizable
for asylum law. 210 Of course, the BIA could seek to sidestep the court's
reasoning or allow petitioner's request to slip by in an unpublished deci-
sion.211 Nonetheless, Perdomo has taken the Ninth Circuit, and all circuits
202. See id. at 29 (concluding that while suggested particular social group pro-
posed before immigration judge was not eligible for protection, "unique complexi-
ties in this area of law" justify remand for further consideration).
203. SeeJulia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting Standard
on Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A14 (noting "favorable recommen-
dation" by officials from Department of Homeland Security and novel claims
brought by attorneys to show likelihood of continued persecution).
204. See Matter of L.R., supra note 199 (discussing impact of L-R- on other do-
mestic violence claims and on gender-based claims generally).
205. See Seipp, supra note 149, at 1423 (referencing questions that Ninth Cir-
cuit directed BIA to answer on remand).
206. See id. (remanding case "for the BIA to determine in the first instance
whether women in Guatemala constitute a particular social group, and, if so,
whether Perdomo has demonstrated a fear of persecution on account of her mem-
bership in such a group" (emphasis added)).
207. See Ruling on Women May Spur Asylum Claims, supra note 5, at A10 (sug-
gesting that L-R- may allow many others in similar circumstances to argue for asy-
lum status).
208. See Anker, supra note 5, at 202 (suggesting that reluctance by circuit
courts to recognize gender-based particular social groups is ending based on re-
cent, gradual changes by courts).
209. See id. (referencing Mohammed as important recent case that, while not
formally permitting women to constitute independent particular social groups, ap-
plied Ninth Circuit and BIA precedent to show that there was no alternative than
to recognize such groups).
210. See Ninth Circuit Finds, supra note 150, at 1428 (reviewing case and consid-
ering basis for remand to BIA in light of cited precedent).
211. See GALLAGHER, supra note 13, § 13-208 (noting that even though unpub-
lished decisions by BIA are not binding on other parties these decisions are consid-
ered demonstrative of BIA's position on issues).
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that follow, to the brink of allowing gender alone to constitute a particular
social group; the BIA must take the plunge.2 12
212. See Fed. Court Opens Door for Guatemalan Asylum Claim, supra note 5 (not-
ing optimism by counsel that BIA will adopt reasoning followed by Ninth Circuit
and grant asylum). In October 2010, the Ninth Circuit implicitly affirmed its hold-
ing in Perdomo stating, "We recently held that the BIA's determination that a social
group consisting of all women in Guatemala was not cognizable conflicted with its
own precedent and remanded the case for further proceedings." Rosario-Lopez v.
Holder, 401 F. App'x 276, 277 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d
662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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